Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China by Ye Chen et al.
Relative Performance Evaluation and
the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China
Ye Chen∗ Hongbin Li† Li-An Zhou‡
May 1, 2005
Abstract
Using data from China, this paper examines the role of relative performance eval-
uation in the turnover decisions made by the central government. We ﬁnd that the
turnover of provincial leaders hinges on provincial economic performance relative to
their immediate predecessors.
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How to motivate government oﬃcials to aid in economic development has become a central
issue in economic transition and development (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). However, the design
of incentive contracts for government oﬃcials has been constrained because it is hard to
measure their performance (Tirole, 1994). As a result, oﬃcials in these countries usually
have poor incentives, and are often associated with shirking, rent seeking and corruption.
China provides a remarkable contrast in this regard. Chinese local oﬃcials have devoted
tremendous attention and energy to enhancing regional economic growth, which is rarely
observed in other transition and developing countries (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001).
Two major explanations have been oﬀered for the strong incentive of the Chinese local
oﬃcials in the reform era. The ﬁrst emphasizes the role of decentralization and high-powered
ﬁscal incentives local governments have during this period (Oi, 1992; Montinola et al., 1995;
Jin et al., 2000). The second points to the career concerns of local oﬃcials empowered by
the performance-based promotion scheme (Maskin et al., 2000; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001;
Whiting, 2001; Li and Zhou, 2005). Maskin et al. (2000) show that the political status of
a Chinese province (measured by the number of Central Committee members) is positively
correlated with the provincial economic ranking. Li and Zhou (2005) present evidence on the
link between political turnover of top provincial leaders and provincial economic performance.
This paper provides further evidence on the second view. Using a more recent dataset
on the turnover of top provincial leaders, we show that their turnover is not only related to
their own performance, as found in Li and Zhou (2005), but also related to the performance
of their immediate predecessors. Our ﬁnding shows that the Chinese central government
1consciously motivates local oﬃcials by linking their turnover to economic growth. More-
over, it employs relative performance evaluation to reduce the noise in evaluation and thus
strengthens the incentive eﬀect.1
2 Data and Empirical Analysis
Since the early 1980s, China, as a unitary state, has shifted its focus of personnel evalu-
ation criteria away from political loyalty to economic performance.2 The enforcement of
the performance-based evaluation in China is facilitated by a score of salient institutional
features. First, personnel control is centralized at the central government, and the economic
performance of provincial leaders is a crucial indicator in personnel evaluations. Second,
local oﬃcials have substantial inﬂuence over the local economy by controlling key economic
resources, such as land, credit and designing local economic policies such as taxation and
government spending. Because of their direct inﬂuence on the local economy, these oﬃcials
are also held responsible for local economic performance. Third, the M-form structure of the
Chinese economy makes each provincial leader’s performance individually distinguishable
and comparable and thereby allows for a sensible link between performance and turnover
(Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin et al., 2000).
Our data cover 344 top provincial leaders (187 party secretaries and 157 governors)
from China’s 28 provinces for the period 1979-2002. This dataset, compiled from a multitude
of sources,3 contains detailed information regarding the provincial leader’s age, education,
1See Holmstrom (1982) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) for the beneﬁts of relative performance evaluation
in ﬁltering common shocks.
2See Lieberthal (1995) and Li and Zhou (2005) for more details about China’s political system and
personnel control in the reform era.
3They include three books in Chinese, i.e., Who’s Who in the Chinese Communist Party (1997), The
Documentation of Administrations of the People’s Republic of China (1996), and China Yearbook (1995-
2previous working experience in the central government, and especially the timing and nature
of appointment. Economic performance data come from the relevant issues of the China
Statistical Yearbook.
The data track down the month and year in which leaders took and/or left oﬃce
and the nature of the turnover—promotion, lateral moves, staying at the same position
or retirement.4 Among all 344 provincial leaders, 25.9 percent were promoted, which is
equivalent to 6.6 percent of the 1,308 province-year observations, and 41.6 percent were
terminated, where terminations include both demotions and retirements.
We use the growth rate of real per capita GDP (at 1980 constant prices) as the indicator
for provincial economic performance. To reﬂect the fact that the central government uses
the cumulative or average performance in its evaluation of provincial leaders (Li and Zhou,
2005), we employ the moving average of provincial GDP growth rates over their tenure as
the performance measure. Diﬀerent from Li and Zhou (2005), we also capture the role of
relative performance evaluation, i.e., the central government using the performance of peers
as a benchmark to evaluate provincial leaders, by introducing two benchmark variables: the
average GDP growth rate of the immediate predecessor and the average GDP growth of
neighboring provinces. Table 1 presents summary statistics of these variables.
We employ the ordered probit model to examine how the probability of promotion
and termination for provincial leaders is aﬀected by their relative economic performance.
The dependent variable, or leader turnover, is a character variable, which equals 0 for a
termination, 1 for remaining at the same level (including lateral moves as well as staying in
2002), and one newspaper, i.e., the People’s Daily.
4See Li and Zhou (2005) for more details about the career mobility of provincial leaders in the reform
era.
3the same position), and 2 for a promotion. We are primarily interested in the eﬀects of the
performance measures including the provincial GDP growth, the provincial GDP growth of
the immediate predecessor and the GDP growth of neighboring provinces. In addition, we
will also control for personal characteristics which might aﬀect the probability of mobility,
such as age, education, previous experience in the central government (denoted by “central
origin”), and tenure on the post. Central origin might aﬀect the prospect of political turnover
because it may represent close connections with the central government. To capture the
potential non-linear eﬀect of age on the probability of turnover, and in particular the eﬀect
of the forced retirement at 65 implemented since the mid-1980s, we add a dummy variable
“age65” which equals one if the leader is 65 or older and zero otherwise. Our regressions also
include provincial and year dummies which account for the eﬀects of both province-speciﬁc
characteristics and cyclical shocks in personnel control policies common to all provinces.
Regression results reported in Table 2 support the view that the Chinese central gov-
ernment uses relative performance evaluation in turnover decisions. In particular, it puts
a large weight on the provincial benchmark set by the immediate predecessor, but not on
the benchmark set by neighboring provinces. As seen from columns 1 and 3, the provincial
GDP growth has a positive coeﬃcient, while the provincial GDP growth of the immediate
predecessor has a negative coeﬃcient, both of which are signiﬁcant. This means that the
likelihood of promotion (termination) for provincial leaders is positively (negatively) associ-
ated with their own economic performance, but negatively (positively) associated with the
performance of the immediate predecessor. However, as indicated by columns 2 and 3, the
estimated coeﬃcient of the performance of neighboring provinces is not signiﬁcant. We also
4try alternative speciﬁcations in columns 4 and 5 by using the diﬀerences between provincial
GDP growth and the two benchmarks, and the results are similar. This ﬁnding supports
the notion that the Chinese central government consciously takes advantage of relative per-
formance evaluation, but only puts weight on provincial benchmarks set by the immediate
predecessor. The benchmark choice by the central government can be rationalized by the
substantial disparity across provinces in China as well as concerns about the potential costs
of non-cooperation generated by the tournaments among neighboring provinces (Lazear,
1989). The eﬀects of other variables are similar to those in Li and Zhou (2005).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 





          
Promotion 1308  0.066  0.248  1  0 
          
Remaining at the same level  1308  0.831  0.375  1  0 
          
Termination 1308  0.103  0.304  1  0 
          
Provincial GDP growth  1370  0.1  0.037  0.247  -0.084 
          
Provincial GDP growth of the 
immediate predecessor 
1273 0.102  0.034  0.209  0.01 
          
GDP growth of neighboring 
provinces 
1380 0.101  0.034  0.199  -0.018 
          
Age 1302  59.771  5.413  75  43 
          
Age65 1302  0.229  0.431  1  0 
          
Education 1302  0.627  0.484  1  0 
          
Tenure 1302  3.115  2.11  12  1 
          
Central origin  1302  0.21  0.407  1  0 
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Table 2: Ordered Probit Regressions Examining the Role of Relative Performance Evaluation in 
Provincial Leader Turnovers in China 
 Dependent  variable:  turnover 
(promotion=1, lateral moves=0, termination=-1) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
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(3.41) 
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    1.909 
(1.55) 












































         










         










         










         
Number  of  observations  1227  1284 1226 1227  1284 
Log-likelihood  ratio  -582  -627 -582 -582  -627 
         
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors. The significance levels of 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent are noted by ***, **, and *. The provincial and year dummies are controlled 
in all regressions. 